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WORKERS’ COMPENSATION AND HOFFMAN PLASTIC: 
PANDORA’S UNDOCUMENTED BOX 
Remember, remember always that all of us, and you and I especially, are 
descended from immigrants and revolutionists. 
—President Franklin D. Roosevelt1 
We need the National Guard to clean up our cities and round them up. . . . 
They have no problem slitting your throat and taking your money or 
selling drugs to your kids or raping your daughter and they are evil people. 
—Chris Simcox2 
INTRODUCTION 
The twenty-first century immigrant in America exists amidst dreams and 
nightmares.  The twentieth century immigrant provided both the foundation 
and versatility that made America one of the most diverse, democratic, and 
dynamic nations on the planet by fulfilling the “American Dream.”3  In the 
aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, xenophobia ran wild 
across the nation.  The immigrant became a dangerous stranger, full of 
criminal and terroristic intent,4 as well as an economic pillager assaulting our 
economy by stealing jobs.5  There was an urgent call to resolve America’s 
immigration problems via militarized borders and more stringent standards for 
legal entry into the country, thus making the twenty-first century a nightmare 
 
 1. Franklin Delano Roosevelt, President of the U.S., Remarks to the Daughters of the 
American Revolution (Apr. 21, 1938), reprinted in THE AMERICAN READER 474 (Diane Ravitch 
ed., rev. 2d ed. 2000). 
 2. David Holthouse, Arizona Showdown: High-powered Firearms, Militia Maneuvers and 
Racism at the Minuteman Project, S. POVERTY L. CTR. INTELL. REP., Summer 2005, available at 
http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-report/browse-all-issues/2005/summer/arizo 
na-showdown (quoting Chris Simcox, co-founder of the Minuteman Project and president of the 
Minuteman Civil Defense Corps, 2005). 
 3. See Everett Carll Ladd, Op-Ed., Don’t Discount the Successes of the American Melting 
Pot, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 4, 1995, at 19. 
 4. See Steven W. Bender, Sight, Sound, and Stereotype: The War on Terrorism and Its 
Consequences for Latinas/os, 81 OR. L. REV. 1153, 1154 (2002) (“[U]ndocumented aliens are 
now seen as a national security threat, as would-be terrorists . . . .”). 
 5. See Adam L. Lounsbury, Comment, A Nationalist Critique of Local Laws Purporting to 
Regulate the Hiring of Undocumented Workers, 71 ALB. L. REV. 415, 416 (2008). 
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for American immigrants.6  Inside the border, the new battlefront is in the U.S. 
economy, where there is a staggering number of undocumented workers in the 
workforce.7All of these things converge into the present-day situation: There 
exist migrants responding to black-market job opportunities,8 employers 
attempting to cut costs by hiring undocumented workers at low wages and with 
few rights,9 and media-savvy politicians assuring the public that with each new 
statute there will be progress toward curbing illegal immigration.10 
Immigration provides a policy paradox.  The unspoken tension is that 
while the United States desperately needs secured borders, undocumented 
immigrants have been powering the U.S. economy with tacit approval for over 
fifty years.11  In fact, many present undocumented immigrants contribute 
actively to our economy, and yet, they receive only marginal returns on their 
labor contributions to our nation.12  There has been a search amongst Congress 
and the courts for a way to enforce immigration laws at workplaces, rather than 
at borders, by shifting the burden of enforcing documentation for lawful 
employment onto employers.13  Voices of concern from both the Court and 
Capitol Hill have warned that until both labor and immigration laws are in 
accordance with each other, there will remain a “perverse” incentive to 
encourage further illegal immigration.14 
 
 6. Kevin R. Johnson, September 11 and Mexican Immigrants: Collateral Damage Comes 
Home, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 849, 852, 857–58 (2003).  Professor Johnson acknowledges that the 
militarization of the border predated the events of September 11.  Id. at 852–53. 
 7. See STEVEN A. CAMAROTA & KAREN JENSENIUS, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, 
BACKGROUNDER: A SHIFTING TIDE: RECENT TRENDS IN THE ILLEGAL IMMIGRANT POPULATION 
1–2 (2009), available at http://www.cis.org/articles/2009/shiftingtide.pdf (finding an estimated 
10.8 million illegal immigrants in the United States in 2009 and noting that the illegal immigrant 
population reflects the unemployment rate among that population). 
 8. See Maria Elena Bickerton, Note, Prospects for a Bilateral Immigration Agreement with 
Mexico: Lessons from the Bracero Program, 79 TEX. L. REV. 895, 914–15 (2001). 
 9. Cf. id. at 916 (noting the low wages paid and advocating for legal status for migrants so 
that the U.S. government might protect their rights). 
 10. Cf. Cecelia M. Espenoza, Relief for Undocumented Students: The Dream Act, 56 FED. 
LAW., July 2009, at 44, 44 (detailing the political grandstanding surrounding the Development, 
Relief, and Education for Alien Minors (DREAM) Act of 2009, S. 729, 111th Cong. (2009)). 
 11. See Bickerton, supra note 8, at 907. 
 12. Francine J. Lipman, The Taxation of Undocumented Immigrants: Separate, Unequal, 
and Without Representation, 9 HARV. LATINO L. REV. 1, 2–6 (2006) (finding that empirical 
studies prove that undocumented workers contribute more into the economy than what they cost 
to support via social services). 
 13. See, e.g., Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 
3359–94 (1986) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2006)); H.R. REP. NO. 99-682(I), at 
45–46 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5649–50. 
 14. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc., v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 155–56 (2002) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting); Janet Napolitano, Sec’y, Dep’t Homeland Sec., Prepared Remarks on Immigration 
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Despite legislative action, there remains a growing black market for 
undocumented labor, which creates both an illegal and exploited labor class.15  
This labor exploitation takes the most grotesque forms, including not paying 
workers for their toils,16 forcing employees to work in ultra hazardous 
conditions with little training,17 and threatening injured workers with 
deportation should they file a workers’ compensation claim.18  In 2002, during 
the midst of this crisis, Hoffman Plastic was decided by the Supreme Court, 
establishing that immigration policies supersede labor policies in regards to 
unionization and labor rights19 and allowing the policy pendulum to swing 
towards favoring black market incentives.20 
In Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, the Supreme Court held that the 
federal immigration laws supersede labor laws precluding the NLRB from 
effectuating their back pay damages to an undocumented worker fired for 
unionizing.21  In the years following the seminal Hoffman Plastic decision, the 
holding has been used repeatedly as an affirmative defense in workers’ 
compensation cases involving undocumented workers.22  Each time, the 
employer cites Hoffman Plastic as preemption to any recovery by an injured 
undocumented plaintiff.23  The focus of this Comment is whether Hoffman 
Plastic, which was decided in regard to unionization and back pay, is properly 
applied when its rationale is utilized in litigation across the country by 
employers to preclude workers’ compensation payments to injured 
undocumented workers.  This Comment examines the rationale and policy 
from courts across the nation in determining whether Hoffman Plastic belongs 
 
Reform at the Center for American Progress (Nov. 13, 2009), available at http://www.dhs.gov/ 
ynews/speeches/sp_1258123461050.shtm. 
 15. See Richard D. Vogel, Harder Times: Undocumented Workers and the U.S. Informal 
Economy, MONTHLY REV., July/Aug. 2006, at 29, available at http://www.monthlyreview.org/ 
0706vogel.htm.  But see Camarota & Jensenius, supra note 7, at 2 (concluding that although 
illegal migration is currently decreasing, when the economy recovers and if enforcement is 
reduced, the illegal population will begin to grow again). 
 16. See Patel v. Quality Inn S., 846 F.2d 700, 701 (11th Cir. 1988) (examining claim for 
back pay); Flores v. Amigon, 233 F. Supp. 2d 462, 463 (E.D.N.Y. 2002) (examining claim by 
undocumented worker for unpaid labor). 
 17. Jason Schumann, Note, Working in the Shadows: Illegal Aliens’ Entitlement to State 
Workers’ Compensation, 89 IOWA L. REV. 709, 712 (2004). 
 18. Id. at 713 n.21 (citing Jenalia Moreno, Undocumented and Endangered, HOUS. CHRON., 
Sept. 3, 2000, at Bus. 1). 
 19. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 535 U.S. at 151. 
 20. Id. at 154–55 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 21. Id. at 151. 
 22. See, e.g., Madeira v. Affordable Hous. Found., Inc., 469 F.3d 219, 223 (2d Cir. 2006); 
Balbuena v. IDR Realty, LLC, 845 N.E.2d 1246, 1250 (N.Y. 2006); Amoah v. Mallah Mgmt., 
LLC, 866 N.Y.S.2d 797, 798–99 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008). 
 23. Madeira, 469 F.3d at 223; Balbuena, 845 N.E.2d at 1250; Amoah, 866 N.Y.S.2d at 798–
99. 
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in workers’ compensation cases, when such an application has serious 
consequences for workplace safety and state police power. 
Part I of this Comment discusses the historical background of federal 
immigration and labor statutes examined in the Hoffman Plastic decision.  Part 
II captures the case law and doctrinal precedent involving cases in which 
illegal immigration and labor laws were at odds with immigration policies.  
Part III explains the lasting effects of the Hoffman Plastic decision, including 
the rationales of the majority and dissent, attempting to resolve the policy 
crisis.  Part IV describes how Hoffman Plastic has been used in workers’ 
compensation litigation and how state and federal courts across the country 
have responded to its application.  This Comment concludes by arguing that 
the application of Hoffman Plastic in workers’ compensation cases is 
misplaced and perversely incentivizes employers to both further violate 
immigration laws by employing undocumented workers and ignore workplace 
safety standards, endangering both legal residents and the undocumented 
claimants. 
I.  BACKGROUND AND THE POLICY PATH TO HOFFMAN PLASTIC 
A. Immigration Legislation from 1790 to 2002 
1. From Open Borders to Ethnic Quotas: Years 1790 to 1952 
America is a nation built by and for immigrants.  The encouragement or 
prohibition on immigration and certain types of immigrants has fluctuated with 
history and foreign policy conflicts.24  The first immigration-related statute in 
the United States was arguably the Naturalization Act of 1790, which required 
immigrants meet the following standards to be eligible for citizenship: be a 
“free white person,” of “good character,” residence in the United States for 
over two years, and residence in any given state for at least one year.25  Then, 
during the late 1800s, Congress enacted a series of statutes establishing limits 
on entry of socially undesirable peoples, such as convicts, prostitutes, lunatics, 
and paupers.26  Starting with the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and 
continuing to the Immigration Act of 1924, Congress began systematically 
excluding targeted countries and ethnic groups from lawfully immigrating into 
the United States.27  While the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 suspended the 
 
 24. See RONALD TAKAKI, A DIFFERENT MIRROR: A HISTORY OF MULTICULTURAL 
AMERICA 7–12 (paperback ed. 1993). 
 25. Act of Mar. 20, 1790 (Naturalization Act of 1790), ch. 3, 1 Stat. 103–04 (repealed 1795). 
 26. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477, 477; Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, 22 Stat. 
214, 214. 
 27. Act of May 6, 1882 (Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882), ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58, 59 (repealed 
1943) (excluding immigrants from China); Act of May 26, 1924 (Immigration Act of 1924), ch. 
190, 43 Stat. 153, 167 (repealed 1952) (providing exceptions from quotas to certain nationalities). 
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Chinese immigration of skilled and unskilled laborers and mining employees,28 
the Immigration Act of 1924 conclusively outlawed all Asian immigration.29  
The aftermath of World War I and the massive influx of immigration in the 
early decades of the twentieth century pushed Congress into the immigration 
quota system that continues to this day.30  The Immigration Act of 1924 
established a two percent quota per country—provided a given country’s 
citizens were not wholly barred from immigrating—meaning that each year, a 
number totaling two percent of the existing U.S. population (i.e., the Irish 
population) would be allowed to immigrate into the United States.31  The quota 
did not effectively limit immigrants from countries which already had sizable 
populations within the United States—thus allowing almost unchecked 
immigration from Ireland, Britain, and Germany—but did restrict the Asiatic 
Triangle and southern European countries, whose populations were smaller 
(and tended to have communist sympathies).32  This tacit immigration regime 
aimed at curbing anarchists33 and Asian immigration remained in place until 
1952.34 
2. From 1952 to 1986: The Era of the Immigration and Nationality Acts 
Immediately following the conclusion of World War II and during the 
advent of the Cold War, Congress enacted the Immigration and Nationality Act 
(INA).35  The purpose of the INA was to codify and clarify the plethora of 
federal statutes that regulated immigration but which lacked systematic and 
unified framework.36  The INA retained a quota system held at roughly 
154,000 immigrants per year for monitored countries, developed a preference 
system for skilled workers and their families, and repealed the earlier statutes 
 
 28. Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 § 1, 22 Stat. at 61. 
 29. See Immigration Act of 1924 § 26, 43 Stat. at 167. 
 30. James F. Smith, A Nation That Welcomes Immigrants? An Historical Examination of 
United States Immigration Policy, 1 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 227, 232 (1995). 
 31. Immigration Act of 1924 § 11(a), 43 Stat. at 159. 
 32. See id. at 155. 
 33. Cf. Keisha A. Gary, Note, Congressional Proposals to Revive Guilt by Association: An 
Ineffective Plan to Stop Terrorism, 8 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 227, 230 (1994) (describing timely 
passage of immigration quotas following the assassination of President McKinley by anarchist 
Leon Czolgosz). 
 34. CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, THREE DECADES OF MASS IMMIGRATION: THE 
LEGACY OF THE 1965 IMMIGRATION ACT (1995), available at http://www.cis.org/articles/1995/ 
back395.html. 
 35. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (amended 
1965) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2006)). 
 36. H.R. REP. NO. 82-1365, at 27 (1952) (“[The Immigration and Nationality Act] represents 
the first attempt to bring within one cohesive and comprehensive statute the various laws relating 
to immigration, naturalization, and nationality.”). 
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barring Asian immigration by allocating 100 visa slots to each Asian country.37  
The INA lacked, however, provisions regarding labor.  Thus, the INA did not 
make it unlawful to employ an illegal alien, nor did it establish any penalties 
for contributing to the black market of illegal labor.38  The INA is an example 
of how immigration and economic interests do not always converge—while 
streamlining immigration policy to tighten security measures out of Cold War 
fears, the government, through the Bracero program, was actively encouraging 
temporary immigration of non-citizens to satisfy agricultural workforce 
needs.39  The INA did not subject Latin America to any quota or numerical 
limitations.40 
As the Civil Rights movement inspired the nation, legislators passed 
amendments to the INA (INAA), which abolished the quota systems and 
established new family- and skill-based standards in an attempt to equalize the 
playing field for all potential immigrants.41  The standards took the form of 
eight priority levels, ranging from offspring of citizens to refugees fleeing from 
communism.42  With the immigration from Western Europe slowing and 
abundant employment of undocumented workers in agriculture, manufacturing, 
and other industries leftover from the Bracero program, the INAA was 
violently silent on illegal immigration’s relationship with labor until 1986.43 
3. The Advent of Awareness: The Immigration Reform and Control Act 
(IRCA) 
Between 1965 and 1985, there was a massive influx of immigrants—
predominantly from Latin American countries—and, due to misguided 
policies, a correlated population of largely illegal and undocumented workers 
across the country.44  For the first time in American history, there was a policy 
shift toward using economic strategy to curb immigration.  Congress effected 
that shift by passing the IRCA, which focused almost exclusively on 
 
 37. See Immigration and Nationality Act, §§ 201(a), 202(c), 66 Stat. at 175, 178. 
 38. Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 892–93 (1984). 
 39. See Bickerton, supra note 8, at 896–97.  The Bracero Program was a bilateral agreement 
between the United States and Mexico established during World War II to provide a cheap and 
steady labor force to U.S. industries affected by the absence of drafted workers.  Id.  Over five 
million undocumented workers would participate in the Bracero Program in the following 
decades.  Id. 
 40. Immigration and Nationality Act, § 101(a)(27), 66 Stat. at 169. 
 41. See Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, §§ 1–3, 79 Stat. 911, 911–13 (codified as 
amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1557 (2006)). 
 42.  Id. § 3, 79 Stat. at 912–14. 
 43. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 144–45 (2001) (noting 
Congress’s failure to address the employment of illegal aliens in the INAA). 
 44. Cf. Bickerton, supra note 8, at 914–15 (noting the significant increase in Mexican 
immigration in the 1970s and 1980s and the incentive for illegal immigrants to remain in the 
United States). 
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employers and the hiring of illegal labor.45  With the IRCA, Congress 
attempted to “close the back door” on illegal immigration by attacking the 
incentive to employ illegal workers without penalty—the rationale being that 
reduced job opportunities would curb illegal immigration.46  The IRCA 
established an impressive verification scheme where the Bureau of Citizenship 
and Immigration Services would issue proper documentation to any alien 
legally entitled to work and which the alien would then present to prospective 
employers upon application for any job.47  To effectuate this policy, Congress 
enacted both civil and criminal penalties for employers who either knowingly 
violated the IRCA by hiring an alien without documentation or did not 
terminate the employment of an alien upon gaining knowledge of the lack of 
documentation.48  In a strange twist of legislative drafting, however, the IRCA 
penalized any alien who provided false documentation to obtain employment, 
but there was no penalty or discussion regarding a penalty for an alien simply 
working without documentation.49 
Therefore, the IRCA finally established proactive policies to encourage 
employers to curb illegal immigration by prohibiting the hiring of aliens 
lacking proper documentation.50  While not resolving all of the complexities of 
illegal immigration, this was a significant shift away from arbitrary quotas and 
into thoughtful policy and economic resolve.  Despite this policy change, 
illegal immigration—particularly from Latin America—flourished as 
employers evaded penalties.  From 1986 to 2005, the number of illegal 
immigrants increased from approximately two million to ten million.51 
 
 45. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2006)). 
 46. H.R. REP. NO. 99-682(I), at 46 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5650; see 
also Court E. Golumbic, Comment, Closing the Open Door: The Impact of the Human 
Immunodeficiency Virus Exclusion on the Legalization Program of the Immigration Control and 
Reform Act of 1986, 15 YALE J. INT’L L. 162, 165 & n.11 (1990) (describing the growing 
importance of employer sanctions to immigration policy as recognized by Congress and President 
Reagan). 
 47. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 § 101(a)(1), 100 Stat. at 3361–63. 
 48. Id. § 101(a)(1), 100 Stat. at 3360, 3366–68. 
 49. Id. § 103(a)(6), 100 Stat. at 3380. 
 50. Id. § 101(a)(1), 100 Stat. at 3360. 
 51. JAMES R. EDWARDS, JR., CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, BACKGROUNDER: TWO 
SIDES OF THE SAME COIN: THE CONNECTION BETWEEN ILLEGAL AND LEGAL IMMIGRATION 6–7 
(2006), available at http://www.cis.org/articles/2006/back106.pdf (estimating that the number of 
undocumented migrants increased from 5 million in 1987, to potentially 10 million 
undocumented migrants in 2005). 
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4. Fences, Terrorists, and Refugees: Immigration Reform from 2002–
2009 
Since the passage of the IRCA in 1986, there has not been much evolution 
in policies regarding illegal immigration and labor from Latin America.  
Several acts have passed, but their effects have been questionable.  The 
Immigration Act of 1990 increased resources for the border patrol and 
established lottery system for immigration quantities.52  The Nicaraguan 
Adjustment and Central American Relief Act of 1997 provided relief from 
deportation from Latin American countries reeling from former Soviet bloc 
control, such as Cuba and Nicaragua.53  Finally, the Illegal Immigration 
Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 formalized deportation and 
criminal penalties for illegal entry into the United States while again allocating 
resources for the border patrol and border fencing.54  This last act did establish 
a stronger policy on illegal aliens in the United States by creating streamlined 
deportation procedures, but overall failed to address the economic reality of 
labor and illegal aliens.55 
In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, there was 
an outcry for border security and a scathing eye was directed upon illegal 
immigration.56  While legislation did pass for issuing driver’s licenses57 and 
financing militarized borders,58 there has not been any significant alteration to 
the INAA or the IRCA statutes.59  In fact, as Mexico’s economy began to 
collapse in recent years from the inception of NAFTA and its losing battle 
against agricultural subsidies, there existed a heightened economic incentive 
 
 52. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, §§ 162, 541, 104 Stat. 4978, 5009, 5057 
(codified in part at 8 U.S.C. § 1153). 
 53. Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-100, 
§§ 201–203, 111 Stat. 2160, 2193–96 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2006)). 
 54. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-208, 
§§ 101–102, 108, 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-553–3009-555, 3009-557–3009-558 (codified at 8 
U.S.C. § 1101). 
 55. See id. §§ 301–309, 110 Stat. at 3009-575–3009-627 (creating procedures for 
deportation but omitting any mention of labor and illegal aliens). 
 56. JOHN TIRMAN, IMMIGRATION AND INSECURITY: POST-9/11 FEAR IN THE UNITED 
STATES 1 (MIT, Ctr. for Int’l Studies, Audit of the Conventional Wisdom Ser. No. 06-09, 2006) 
 57. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-13, §§ 101, 201–202, 119 Stat. 231, 302, 311–15 
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1), 49 U.S.C. § 30301 (2006)) (requiring states to check legality 
of residency for applicants). 
 58. Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-367, §§ 1–2, 120 Stat. 2638, 2638 (codified 
at 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2006)). 
 59. Cf. Maurice Hew, Jr., The Fence and the Wall (Mart) . . . Maginot Line Mentality, 39 
CONN. L. REV. 1383, 1386–88 (2007) (noting the failure of President Bush to come through on 
his promise of immigration reform). 
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for illegal immigration.60  Despite the militarization of the border between the 
United States and Mexico, there is an thriving and powerful business rooted in 
illegal human trafficking from the deserts of Mexico across dangerous and 
deserted areas of Arizona, Texas, and New Mexico.61  If, as Congress intended, 
the back door closed in 1986, then from 1987 to 2009, the windows opened 
and the debates raged onward towards massive deportation, guest visas, and 
amnesty.62  Meanwhile, employers continuted operating as they did half a 
century ago, profiting and accelerating the problem leading into the outcome in 
Hoffman Plastic. 
B. The Labor Laws & Policies Concerning NLRA and Workers’ 
Compensation 
1. The NLRA and NLRB 
Similar to the streamlining of immigration policy with the advent of the 
INA in 1952, the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) in 1935 was an 
attempt to streamline the pitfalls and problems associated with earlier labor 
legislation such as the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) of 1933.63  In 
the midst of the Great Depression, workers needed an agency that could 
enforce workers’ and unions’ rights against employers.64  The only 
governmental labor entity in this timeframe, the National Labor Board (NLB), 
lacked enforcement authority,65 and in 1935, the Supreme Court invalidated 
NIRA as a violation of the Commerce Clause.66  With unemployment soaring 
and the economy tumbling, the NLRA was passed on July 5, 1935.67  It set 
forth a number of changes, including the listing of unfair employment practices 
to protect workers.68 
The NLRA also established the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), 
which had two overarching functions: first, to hold elections which in 
employees could decide whether and how to unionize, free from employer 
 
 60. Marla Dickerson, Placing Blame for Mexico’s Ills, L.A. TIMES, July 1, 2006, at C1. 
 61. Alejandro Portes, The Fence to Nowhere, AM. PROSPECT, Oct. 2007, at 26, 27. 
 62. Cf. id. (arguing that border militarization has had the opposite effect its supporters 
desired).  For a classic text providing useful background on the scope of the immigration 
problem, see LUIS ALBERTO URREA, THE DEVIL’S HIGHWAY (2004). 
 63. See MICHAEL C. HARPER ET AL., LABOR LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 81–
82 (6th ed. 2007) (citing National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (codified at 29 
U.S.C. § 151 (2006)); National Industrial Recovery Act, ch. 90, 48 Stat. 195, declared 
unconstitutional by A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)). 
 64. See id. at 80–81. 
 65. Id. at 81. 
 66. Id. at 82 (citing A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S. at 549–50). 
 67. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 
U.S.C. §§ 151–169 (2006)). 
 68. Id. § 8, 49 Stat. at 452–53 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158). 
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oppression; and second, to enforce the NLRA.69  Penalties for violations could 
take the form of reinstatement orders, back pay awards, cease-and-desist 
orders, injunctions, and other remedies imposed on employers for violating 
workers’ rights under the NLRA.70  While illegal aliens are limited in their 
ability to recover workers’ compensation,71 other statutes still provide avenues 
of recovery for illegal aliens.  Both the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and 
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights act allow back pay recovery for rights 
violations by employers, both of which currently remain beyond the scope of 
Hoffman Plastic.72 
Procedurally, the NLRB conducts a hearing on an alleged violation of the 
NLRA and makes a ruling allowing or denying a penalty upon the employer 
for the violation; both the remedy and burden vary with the alleged violation.73  
These rulings are appealable to the local U.S. Court of Appeals.74  The 
NLRA’s definitions of unfair labor practices went hand-in-hand with the 
creation of the NLRB to enforce and protect workers’ rights.75  In the 
aftermath of Hoffman Plastic, the concern remains the same: that employers 
have carte blanche to hire illegal labor and—in direct contravention of the 
NLRA—fire them for unionizing without any penalty.76  In effect, a slave-like 
immigrant labor class is being sustained and oppressed. 
2. Workers’ Compensation: Foundation and Rationale 
Workers’ compensation is a system of providing benefits to an employee 
for occupational injuries.77  Usually—each state varies—the employee must 
 
 69. Id. §§ 3, 6, 9–10, 49 Stat. at 451–53 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 153, 156, 159–61). 
 70. Thomas J. Walsh, Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB: How the Supreme Court 
Eroded Labor Law and Workers Rights in the Name of Immigration Policy, 21 LAW & INEQ. 313, 
318 (2003) (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 160(c), 160(j) (2000)). 
 71. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 151–52 (2002).  Aliens’ rights 
under workers’ compensation statutes are limited by the deference given to a state’s definition of 
an employee.  Cf. Gregory T. Presmanes & Seth Eisenberg, Hazardous Condition: The Status of 
Illegal Immigrants and Their Entitlement to Workers’ Compensation Benefits, 43 TORT TRIAL & 
INS. PRAC. L.J. 247, 254 (2008) (providing examples where states’ definitions of employees have 
determined aliens’ compensation rights). 
 72. Walsh, supra note 70, at 318–19 & n.43 (citing Patel v. Quality Inn S., 846 F.2d 700, 
706 (11th Cir. 1988) (interpreting FLSA to allow undocumented workers the right to back pay)).  
Title VII has not received as much judicial attention post-Hoffman Plastic, but at least one 
commentator believes that it retains its utility.  See, e.g., Robert I. Correales, Did Hoffman Plastic 
Compounds, Inc., Produce Disposable Workers?, 14 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 103, 147–50 
(2003). 
 73. National Labor Relations Act § 10, 49 Stat. at 453–55 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 160). 
 74. Id. § 10(f), 49 Stat. at 455 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 160(f)). 
 75. Cf. HARPER ET AL., supra note 63, at 82–83. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Presmanes & Eisenberg, supra note 71, at 248. 
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prove the injury occurred during the course of employment, at which point the 
employer must provide medical care for the injured employee.78  The driving 
force behind workers’ compensation is to reduce litigation in courts and 
manage costs for employers by spreading the costs through the purchasing of 
insurance to cover workers’ injuries.79 
Prior to the modern workers’ compensation systems, there existed a long 
and arduous road to resolving an injured worker’s claim.80  In principle, 
workers had the ability to file a tort suit against another worker who, through 
negligence, caused them to be injured.81  This abstract right was curtailed in 
the 1842 case Farwell v. Boston & Worchester Railroad Corp., in which the 
Massachusetts Supreme Court imported the English doctrine of fellow-servant 
rule.82  Under that doctrine, a servant had no claim against the master 
(employer) for injuries caused by another worker; rather, claims were limited 
to incidences where the employer was the party at fault.83  Courts started to 
limit the fellow-servant rule by allowing dramatic and influential claims on a 
case by case basis.84  Despite doctrinal limits, the system was still saturated 
with claims.85  The rationale holding the nineteenth century employee 
compensation system together was that workers who took dangerous jobs 
would be compensated accordingly and, therefore, assumed the risk of injury, 
thereby freeing the employer from bearing any further costs.86  This concept 
has returned in the wake of the Hoffman Plastic workers’ compensation cases 
concerning illegal labor.87 
In the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, injured workers pursued 
recompense via tort—an inefficient and costly system for both sides, and a 
system which tended to favor employers.88  Both employees and employers 
found this system to be arbitrary in its results.  Employees faced a difficult 
choice in that if they tried to settle with the employer or insurance company 
 
 78. See id. 
 79. See Lawrence M. Friedman & Jack Ladinsky, Social Change and the Law of Industrial 
Accidents, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 50, 70–71 (1967). 
 80. Cf. id. at 53 (outlining the common law rules of tort applicable before the introduction of 
the workers’ compensation system). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 55 (citing Farwell v. Bos. & Worchester R.R. Corp., 45 Mass. (4 Met.) 49 (1842)). 
 83. Id. at 53. 
 84. Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 79, at 59. 
 85. See id. (noting that the narrowing of the doctrine did not succeed in stopping industrial 
accident litigation). 
 86. Id. at 55. 
 87. See Presmanes & Eisenberg, supra note 71, at 248 (questioning whether employers must 
pay workers’ compensation benefits for injured illegal immigrants). 
 88. Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 79, at 53, 65–67. 
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they faced a wait ranging anywhere from six months to six years,89 or if they 
tried to litigate the matter, they faced an arsenal of defenses and much of any 
recovery was typically absorbed by attorneys’ contingency fees.90  Employers 
had the headache of unpredictable jury verdicts, courts costs, and haggling 
with insurance companies regarding these claims.91  Even the courts 
themselves found the flood of litigation and the character of claims 
disheartening, as Chief Justice J.B. Winslow of Wisconsin stated: 
[T]he results to life and limb and human happiness [are] so distressing that the 
attempt to honestly administer cold, hard rules of law . . . make[s] drafts upon 
the heart and nerves which no man can appreciate who has not been obliged to 
meet the situation himself . . . . 
. . . 
These are burning and difficult questions with which the courts cannot 
deal . . . .92 
Judge, employer, and employee would find relief in workers’ compensation 
statutes. 
In the opening years of the twentieth century, states began to pass workers’ 
compensation statutes, creating a domino effect as employers and legislators 
on a state by state basis determined it was better to indemnify injured workers 
with set schedules, caps, and insurance, than to constantly risk a showdown in 
court where damages could vary wildly.93  Between 1911 and 1948, all fifty 
states passed some form of workers’ compensation statutes, reducing the flood 
of litigation by giving employers fixed liability for an employee’s injury, 
provided the injury qualified.94 
Despite these advancements, there are substantial critics of the system who 
find workers’ compensation to be codified oppression of the worker.95  The 
main contention is that by waiving the right to bring suit, the worker loses a 
fundamental right of recovery and leaves his or her fate to a set schedule of 
fees, damages, and medical care, all of which can be highly suspect depending 
on the state system.96  Some common problems are that fee schedules are too 
 
 89. Id. at 66 (citing WALTER F. DODD, ADMINISTRATION OF WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION 
23–24 (1936)). 
 90. Id. at 66, 70 (listing defenses including assumption of risk and contributory negligence). 
 91. See id. at 66–67. 
 92. Id. at 67 (third and fourth alterations in original) (quoting Driscoll v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 
129 N.W. 401, 408–09 (Wis. 1911)). 
 93. Friedman & Ladinsky, supra note 79, at 70–71. 
 94. Id. 
 95. See Martha T. McCluskey, The Illusion of Efficiency in Workers’ Compensation 
“Reform”, 50 RUTGERS L. REV. 657, 679–80 (1998). 
 96. See Eston W. Orr, Jr., Note, The Bargain Is No Longer Equal: State Legislative Efforts 
to Reduce Workers’ Compensation Costs Have Impermissibly Shifted the Balance of the Quid Pro 
Quo in Favor of Employers, 37 GA. L. REV. 325, 351–52, 356–57 (2002) (arguing that some 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2011] WORKERS’ COMPENSATION AND HOFFMAN PLASTIC 1223 
abstract—while someone who lost an arm might be unable to find work and 
needs substantial assistance, he is considered only proportionally disabled 
according to the schedules and, thus, is expected to expediently find work.97  
Another issue relates to new injuries or ongoing medical treatments that fall 
beyond the scope of the statutory framework or employer-insurance 
agreement.98  Finally, many employers still contest the injuries as being self-
imposed or falling beyond the scope of recovery, thereby leaving the injured 
worker to the clutches of the workers’ compensation appeal process.99  This 
process starts with administrative judges and, upon subsequent appeals, finds 
itself finally in the state court system, which can be a long and arduous process 
for an injured worker simply trying to get some medical assistance.100 
Despite the criticisms and disadvantages of the workers’ compensation 
system, it remains in full force and provides policy incentives for workplace 
safety and employee protection.  Since it is a state-based system of rights, each 
state’s definition of an “employee” becomes highly significant to recovery for 
illegal aliens.101  Courts have recognized the ability for an illegal alien to 
recover when they have been injured on the job, irrespective of immigration 
policies.102  The ability for state courts to hold state-based employers 
accountable for workplace injuries is of substantial concern and public 
policy.103 
II.  LABYRINTHS AND LOOPHOLES: THE CASE LAW PRIOR TO HOFFMAN 
PLASTIC 
In deciding Hoffman Plastic, the Supreme Court was attempting to resolve 
more a decade of conflict involving immigration legislation, labor boards, and 
undocumented workers.104  Among many others, four primary cases set the 
 
states altered the balance crucial to workers’ compensation altered by raising their compensability 
standards, lowering disability payments, limiting medical benefits, restricting litigation costs, and 
expanding employer immunity). 
 97. Cf. Ellen Smith Pryor, Compensation and a Consequential Model of Loss, 64 TUL. L. 
REV. 783, 818–20 (1990). 
 98. See McCluskey, supra note 95, at 681 (providing carpal tunnel syndrome and back 
sprain as examples). 
 99. See Edwin L. Felter, Jr. & Sarah A. Hubbard, Erosion of the Exclusive Remedy in 
Workers’ Compensation, COLO. LAW., Dec. 2002, at 83, 84–85. 
 100. See Linda J. Starr, Current Issues, Injured on the Job: Using Alternative Dispute 
Resolution to Improve Workers’ Compensation in Minnesota, 18 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 
487, 491–95 (1997) (describing the procession of workers’ compensation claims in Minnesota). 
 101. Cf. Correales, supra note 72, at 151–52 (contrasting workers’ compensation claims in 
jurisdictions that consider undocumented workers to be employees with those that do not). 
 102. Presmanes & Eisenberg, supra note 71, at 253; see infra Part IV. 
 103. Cf. Joan T.A. Gabel et al., The New Relationship Between Injured Worker and 
Employer: An Opportunity for Restructuring the System, 35 AM. BUS. L.J. 403 (1998). 
 104. See Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 142 n.2 (2002). 
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stage for Hoffman Plastic: Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB;105 Local 512, Warehouse & 
Office Workers’ Union v. NLRB;106 Del Rey Tortilleria, Inc. v. NLRB;107 and 
NLRB v. A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, Inc.108 
In 1984, Justice O’Connor authored a troublesome opinion in Sure-Tan, 
Inc. v. NLRB, where the Court stated that the NLRA applied to undocumented 
workers.109  In the majority opinion, Justice O’Connor stated the employer 
violated the NLRA by reporting workers to INS for unionizing, thereby clearly 
establishing a violation of workers’ rights.110 Justice O’Connor affirmed that 
since the NLRB is entitled to define who qualifies as a worker, the NLRA’s 
definitions are inclusive to undocumented workers.111  The NLRB awarded 
reinstatement remedies to the workers, which the Seventh Circuit conditioned 
on their legal re-entry to the country.112  The Court affirmed the Board’s award 
of reinstatement as valid and binding.113  On the other hand, the Court ruled 
that the Court of Appeals exceeded its authority under the NLRA when it 
modified the NLRB’s order to include six months back pay for these 
undocumented workers.114  Justice O’Connor stated that since under the 
NLRA, undocumented workers are not available to work, the remedy was 
speculative and thus not sufficiently tailored to the unfair labor practice.115 
Conversely, in the very same holding, the Court clearly affirmed that the 
NLRA applies to undocumented workers and that there is little conflict 
between the INA and NLRA.116  Justice O’Connor stated that effectuating the 
NLRA in protecting undocumented workers from discrimination and unfair 
working conditions implicitly ensures that legal employees are also protected 
at the same worksite.117  In a moment foreshadowing Hoffman Plastic, the 
Court stated that holding employers culpable under the NLRA regarding illegal 
labor removes a perverse incentive to hire illegal labor; therefore, the 
 
 105. 467 U.S. 883, 891–92 (1984) (holding that undocumented aliens are “employees” under 
the NLRA). 
 106. 795 F.2d 705, 719–20 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that illegal workers could collect back 
pay under the NLRA). 
 107. 976 F.2d 1115, 1121–22 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding that illegal workers could not collect 
back pay under the NLRA). 
 108. 134 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that illegal workers could collect back pay under 
the NLRA). 
 109. Cf. Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 892, 902–05 (upholding the tolling of back pay until legal 
readmission into the United States). 
 110. Id. at 894–95. 
 111. Id. at 891–92. 
 112. Id. at 889. 
 113. Id. at 902–03. 
 114. Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 899. 
 115. Id. at 900–01. 
 116. Id. at 894. 
 117. Id. at 892. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2011] WORKERS’ COMPENSATION AND HOFFMAN PLASTIC 1225 
immigration policies and congressional intent are efficiently fulfilled in this 
course.118  This dissonance between the two foundational holdings in Hoffman 
Plastic was left unresolved; the Court in Sure-Tan lamented that while the 
courts can only work within the confines of each act, the legislature is free to 
resolve the issue with more clarity.119  The resounding fear was that without 
NLRA protections and union involvement for undocumented workers, “there 
would be . . . a subclass of workers without a comparable stake in the 
collective goals of their legally resident co-workers, thereby eroding the unity 
of all the employees and impeding effective collective bargaining.”120 
In 1986, on the eve of Congressional action in passing the IRCA, the Ninth 
Circuit in Local 512, Warehouse & Office Workers’ Union v. NLRB declared 
that not only were undocumented workers protected by the NLRA, but also 
determined that granting them back-pay “does not detract” from immigration 
policy goals.121  There, the employer laid off three workers and then refused to 
honor a collective bargaining contract.122  The court read Sure-Tan’s holding to 
say that it did not govern undocumented workers who remain in the United 
States and are not subject to any active deportation process.123  The court 
interpreted Sure-Tan to be concerned with illegal border crossing—a view 
made possible since the INA was the only federal immigration policy 
controlling at the time and did not outlaw the employment of undocumented 
workers.124  In fact, the INA did not even make it a crime to be employed after 
illegally entering the country; thus, the court found, as long as the workers 
remained in the United States and were available to work, they were entitled to 
the back pay remedies afforded by the NLRA.125 
The first seminal case after the passing of the IRCA, Del Rey Tortilleria, 
Inc. v. NLRB, found that Local 512 was misguided in its conclusions and now, 
under the IRCA, undocumented workers are not entitled to back pay.126  The 
Seventh Circuit held that while the NLRA still considers undocumented 
workers as employees, the IRCA disavows any ability to grant back pay since 
employment of undocumented labor is now illegal and cannot be 
encouraged.127  In a twist of fate, since the unfair labor practice at issue in Del 
Rey Tortilleria occurred before the passing of the IRCA, the court relied on 
 
 118. Id. at 903. 
 119. Sure-Tan, 467 U.S. at 904. 
 120. Id. at 892. 
 121. Local 512, Warehouse & Office Workers’ Union v. NLRB, 795 F.2d 705, 722 (9th Cir. 
1986). 
 122. Id. at 709. 
 123. Id. at 717, 719. 
 124. Id. at 719. 
 125. Id at 719, 722. 
 126. Del Rey Tortilleria, Inc. v. NLRB, 976 F.2d 1115, 1119–21 (7th Cir. 1992). 
 127. Id. at 1121. 
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Sure-Tan rationale: There cannot be any back pay for undocumented workers 
who were not legally available to work.128  The Seventh Circuit concluded by 
urging any worker seeking to utilize a reinstatement remedy from the NLRB to 
produce documents proving they are legally allowed to work in the United 
States.129 
The last major case prior to Hoffman Plastic was the 1995 decision NLRB 
v. A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Group, Inc.,130 in which the pendulum swung back 
towards finding justification to award undocumented workers back pay.  The 
NLRB found that the NLRA and IRCA are not competing policies, but in fact 
“must be read in harmony as complementary elements of a legislative scheme 
explicitly intended, in both cases, to protect the rights of employees in the 
American workplace.”131  The NLRB found that both acts were established 
with similar congressional intent for the workplace, in that both the NLRA and 
IRCA are to ensure lawful workers in the American economy are afforded 
proper protections both from unfair labor practices and unfair illegal labor 
competition.132  The Board assessed the congressional intent in the IRCA and 
its emphasis on penalties on employers for hiring workers without proper 
documentation, characterizing the threat as “[a] ready supply of individuals 
willing to work for substandard wages in unsafe workplaces, with unregulated 
hours and no rights of redress, [which] enables the unscrupulous employers 
that depend on illegal aliens to turn away Americans and legally working alien 
applicants who hesitate to accept the same conditions.”133  The NLRB found 
that one way to discourage corrupt employers looking to put both illegal labor 
and the American working class at dangerous odds with each other is by 
requiring such employers to reinstate and award back pay to undocumented 
workers.134  Any other outcome would provide employers with a windfall amid 
violations of both NLRA and the IRCA, allowing workplace abuses to 
increase, since undocumented workers will not report abuses in fear of 
deportation proceedings.135 
As the case law and policy pendulum swung back and forth amid these 
cases, the Supreme Court had yet to speak to the issue since Sure-Tan.  With 
the IRCA officially in effect for more than fourteen years, the Hoffman Plastic 
decision emerged, establishing a new paradigm of jurisprudence on labor, 
immigration, and the fate of the undocumented worker. 
 
 128. Id. at 1120–21. 
 129. Id. at 1123. 
 130. A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Grp., Inc., 320 N.L.R.B. 408 (1995). 
 131. Id. at 408. 
 132. See id. at 414–15. 
 133. Id. at 414. 
 134. See id. 
 135. A.P.R.A. Fuel Oil Buyers Grp., 320 N.L.R.B. at 414. 
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III.  HOFFMAN PLASTIC COMPOUNDS, INC. V. NLRB 
A. Background to Hoffman Plastic Compounds 
The factual and procedural background underlying Hoffman Plastic 
created a perfect policy paradox that was doomed to be inherited by the 
Supreme Court.  In May 1988, Hoffman Plastic hired Jose Castro and seven 
months later fired him due to AFL-CIO union organizing activities at its 
plant.136  The NLRB found the termination of Mr. Castro to be in direct 
violation of § 8(a)(3) of the NLRA, under which an employer terminating an 
employee in regards to his union activities is illegal.137  The remedies awarded 
by the NLRB were reinstatement and back pay, thus requiring an 
administrative hearing to determine the amount of back pay.138  At this 
hearing, Mr. Castro admitted that he was not a legal citizen of the United 
States and that he had provided false documentation to Hoffman when 
obtaining employment.139  The administrative law judge (ALJ) held that both 
back pay and reinstatement were precluded by Sure-Tan and federal 
immigration law (IRCA).140  The NLRB reversed the ALJ’s finding and held 
that back pay was the best way to effectuate immigration policies, thereby 
curbing employers from being shielded by the IRCA for direct NLRA 
violations.141  Hoffman Plastic appealed to the Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia; the petition was denied, affirming the NLRB’s finding for back 
pay for Mr. Castro.142  In the midst of the swirling case law of Sure-Tan, 
APRA, and two major congressional statutes at odds with each other (IRCA 
and NLRA), the Supreme Court granted certiorari.143  The 5-4 decision was the 
result of a tense struggle, evidenced by the divergent rationales of the majority 
and dissent; each side concluded that their position resolved the crisis while 
asserting the other encouraged more immigration policy mischief.144 
 
 136. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 140 (2002). 
 137. Id. (citing 306 N.L.R.B. 100 (1992); National Labor Relations Act, § 8(a)(3), 49 Stat. 
449, 452 (codified as amended 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2006)). 
 138. Id. at 140–41. 
 139. Id. at 141. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 535 U.S. at 141. 
 142. Id. at 142. 
 143. Id. 
 144. See id. at 151–52; id. at 155–56 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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B. Holding and Analysis of the Hoffman Plastic Majority 
The majority opinion reversed the NLRB and D.C. Circuit Court of 
Appeals, holding that the IRCA precludes the NLRB from having power to 
award back pay to Mr. Castro.145  Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the 
majority, found support in both Congress’s express intent when passing the 
IRCA as well as case law.146 
The majority relied upon two prior holdings in which the Supreme Court 
had held that the NLRB could not grant back pay due to an employee’s illegal 
acts.147  Justice Rehnquist reaffirmed that the NLRB’s remedies are limited 
when employees’ actions violate federal statutes.148  Not one to ignore the 
elephant in the room, Justice Rehnquist directly asserted that the Supreme 
Court holding in Sure-Tan is still binding in that the NLRA applies to 
undocumented workers.149 
The Court found that their decision in ABF Freight was distinguishable 
from the facts of Hoffman Plastic, notwithstanding both cases contained 
employees committing illegal acts.150  In ABF Freight, the Court held that an 
employee’s false testimony at a compliance proceeding does not by itself 
require the NLRB to deny back pay.151  In the Hoffman Plastic opinion, Justice 
Rehnquist distinguished ABF Freight based on several factors, including the 
fact that federal statutes were not implicated and the fact that the testimony did 
not render the entire employment relationship illegal.152  Justice Rehnquist 
asserted that unlike ABF Freight, here, all three of those distinctive factors 
were implicated when Mr. Castro provided false documents to gain 
employment.153  These differences, the Court explained, required that the 
Southern S.S. Co. and Fansteel doctrines control when addressing the facts of 
Hoffman Plastic.154 
 
 145. Id. at 151–52. 
 146. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 535 U.S. at 140, 145, 147, 149 (“We find . . . that 
awarding back pay to illegal aliens runs counter to policies underlying IRCA, policies the Board 
has no authority to enforce or administer.”). 
 147. Id. at 143 (citing S. S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 46–47 (1942); NLRB v. Fansteel 
Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 257–58 (1939)).  In both cases cited, the Supreme Court had 
held that serious illegal conduct, such as the violent seizing of property (Fansteel) and inciting a 
mutiny (S. S.S. Co.), foreclosed the NLRB from being able to award back pay.  Id. at 143–44 
(citing S. S.S. Co., 316 U.S. 46–47; Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 at 257–58). 
 148. Id. at 144. 
 149. Id. at 144, 147–48 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2006)).  This assertion came despite the fact 
that the IRCA criminalized the actions underlying the Sure-Tan decision.  Cf. id. 
 150. Id. at 145–46. 
 151. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 535 U.S. at 145. 
 152. Id. at 146. 
 153. See id. 
 154. Id. 
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The majority’s main conclusion was that Congress’s intent in passing the 
IRCA’ was to curb illegal immigration by making it a crime to provide false 
documents to gain employment in the United States.155  The preliminary action 
by Mr. Castro, providing false documents, violated the IRCA; therefore, any 
latter violation of the NLRA would be a consequence of the original action—a 
violation of immigration law.156  Justice Rehnquist stated that to award back 
pay to an undocumented worker who previously violated federal law “not only 
trivializes the immigration laws, it also condones and encourages future 
violations.”157  Bolstering his position, Justice Rehnquist explained that 
typically, workers must mitigate damages by searching for employment while 
their case is pending,158 which in this case, would require Mr. Castro to further 
violate the IRCA by once again providing false documents to gain mitigating 
employment.159  The Court explained that Hoffman was not getting a windfall; 
the company was issued a cease and desist order and was directed to post 
notice to employees of their rights under the NLRA.160  In issuing this 
decision, the majority ended the era of the INA, Sure-Tan, and allowing NLRB 
to effectuate back pay remedies for undocumented workers.161  The Court 
stated that the policy paradox is solved by squarely enforcing IRCA penalties 
over NLRA remedies when they pertain to illegal immigration and back pay of 
undocumented workers.162 
C. Dissenting from the “Wink and Nod” 
The four dissenting justices (Breyer, Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg) 
concluded in their opinion that there is no conflict of immigration and labor 
policies and that awarding back pay is both within the scope of power for the 
NLRB as well as in accord with immigration policies.163  The dissenting 
opinion, authored by Breyer, based its position on: 1) the importance of NLRA 
remedies; 2) the perverse incentives created by superseding IRCA over NLRA; 
3) distinguishing the majority’s case law; and 4) deferring to administrative 
agencies.164 
The dissent argued that the importance of the NLRA—specifically the 
back pay remedy afforded by the NLRB—is evidenced by over thirty years of 
 
 155. See id. at 147–48. 
 156. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 535 U.S. at 141, 148–49. 
 157. Id. at 150. 
 158. Id. at 150–51 (citing Sure-Tan, Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883, 901 (1984)). 
 159. Id. at 150–51. 
 160. Id. at 152. 
 161. Cf. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 535 U.S. at 147–53. 
 162. Cf. id. at 151–52. 
 163. Id. at 153 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 164. See id. at 153–61. 
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case law,165 spanning from Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB166 to A.P.R.A 
Fuel Oil Buyers Group, Inc.167  Justice Breyer found the remedy necessary to 
combat illegal conduct and protect both employees and the market economy 
from mischievous employers wanting to violate the NLRA.168  The majority, 
Justice Breyer argued, erroneously believed that awarding back pay 
encourages violations, but socioeconomics is what drives migrants to illegally 
enter the country.169  Thus, by removing penalties on employers, the majority 
created a “perverse economic incentive” to hire undocumented workers.170  
Therefore, what the majority has done actually creates a “wink and nod” black 
market labor economy where the very purpose behind the IRCA—the curbing 
of illegal hiring and illegal entry into the United States—is undermined by 
only slapping employers lightly on the wrists.171 
Justice Breyer also found the majority’s statutory analysis of the IRCA to 
be weak and unsupported, since nowhere in the IRCA does Congress speak to 
how providing false documents affects other agencies’ awards, remedies, or 
powers.172  Furthermore, the dissent illustrates that the IRCA and the very 
provisions upon which the majority bases its opinion are all intended to 
effectuate labor policies.173  Therefore, curbing illegal immigration would be 
best effectuated by deferring to the NLRB, rather than to the IRCA.174  In 
addition, the dissent noted that the Attorney General and other governmental 
agencies empowered to enforce immigration law fully supported the NLRB’s 
decision to award back pay.175  The dissent finally argued that there is no real 
tension between the NLRA and IRCA: the IRCA penalizes Mr. Castro for his 
providing of false documents,176 and the NLRA penalizes Hoffman for 
violating the NLRA.177  Thus, the immigration policy purpose argument made 
by the majority seems to fall apart upon a contextual glance. 
Justice Breyer next found that the majority’s endorsement of the Southern 
Steamship Co. and Fansteel decisions was misguided and Hoffman Plastic’s 
facts are more analogous to ABF Freight.178  Here, the dissent states, Mr. 
 
 165. See id. at 154. 
 166. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 535 U.S. at 154 (citing Golden State Bottling Co. v. NLRB, 
414 U.S. 168, 185 (1973)). 
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 171. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, 535 U.S. at 155–56. 
 172. Id. at 154–55. 
 173. Id. at 156–57. 
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 175. Id. at 158. 
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 177. Id. at 155–56. 
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Castro was fired entirely without cause, while in both Southern Steamship Co. 
and Fansteel, the employees—in addition to their unionization activities—had 
committed independent criminal acts which made their termination proper.179  
The Hoffman Plastic dissent felt that Justice Rehnquist’s argument that an 
aggressive seizure of property and mutiny are somehow analogous to a worker 
fired for unionizing and later found to be undocumented was misplaced.180  In 
ABF Freight, committing perjury did not preclude NLRA remedies, the dissent 
noted, and further, in that very case the Court explained that the NLRB has 
“broad discretion” to resolve a labor law violation with back pay despite civil 
or criminal infractions.181  Thus, the dissent articulated, the controlling line of 
case law should have been ABF Freight, not case law based on mutinies and 
violent property seizure.182 
Finally, the dissent argued that even if its finding that there was no policy 
tension between the IRCA and NLRA and that the NLRB is therefore 
empowered to award back pay was erroneous, Chevron’s deference-to-
reasonable-agency-decisions doctrine should apply.183  In Chevron, the Court 
held that if an administrative statute is ambiguous, then courts should grant a 
deference to reasonable interpretation by the administering agency.184  Here, 
the dissent argued that the NLRB carefully considered the immigration and 
labor policy consequences, the Attorney General supported the Board’s 
findings, and the finding was reasonable, and thus, the NLRB’s findings 
should control on a matter within its authoritative scope.185  The dissent 
concluded that not only is there no conflict of laws here, but the majority’s 
usurping of enforcing labor law will actually defeat the purpose of the IRCA, 
dilute the power of the NLRA, and increase the flow of illegal immigration as 
a perverse economic loophole is now created.186 
D. Hoffman Plastic in its Own Backyard (NLRB Violations) 2002–2009 
The Hoffman Plastic decision has generated a large amount of scholarship, 
as well as stirring up controversy amongst Latino advocates.  Many of these 
advocates believe that Hoffman Plastic has created a license to exploit;187 this 
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NLRB: Leaving Undocumented Workers Unprotected Under United States Labor Laws?, 6 
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contention has been made true by the increasingly novel ways employers have 
employed Hoffman Plastic in litigation.188  More than academics and interest 
groups have commented on Hoffman Plastic.  Among other governmental 
agencies giving a skeptical glance at the efficiency of the Hoffman Plastic 
decision for both labor and immigration law,189  the GAO office estimated that 
Hoffman Plastic will have adversely affected over 5.5 million workers.190  In 
short, while employers rejoiced, there arose a growing fear that the Hoffman 
Plastic precedent would be stretched to preclude other remedies to 
undocumented workers including Title VII, the Civil Rights Act, and Family 
and Medical Leave Act claims.191  Many of these areas are still unexplored or 
left with limited state lower court opinions, thus leaving it unresolved whether 
Hoffman Plastic forecloses recovery.192  Only the Ninth Circuit has 
distinguished the NLRA from Title VII, holding that undocumented workers 
are not precluded from recovery.193  These inconsistent results have led many 
government agencies in “refus[ing] to expand Hoffman beyond back pay.”194 
Overall, the trend is for courts to hold that while back pay from a knowing 
violator of the IRCA is not within the NLRB’s power by Hoffman Plastic, the 
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wages at the wage rate of his country of origin, unless he could prove his employer knew about 
his undocumented status at the time of hiring). 
 193. See Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1075 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 
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other avenues of recovery has not been foreclosed; this implies that the policy 
tension has not been resolved as both illegal immigration and substantial labor 
abuses are still prevalent in the United States.  Nowhere has the battleground 
of litigation been more reactive and powerful as in the realm of workers’ 
compensation, where Hoffman has been applied with staggering results. 
IV.  HOFFMAN PLASTIC’S APPLICATION TO WORKERS’ COMPENSATION CASES 
A. Hoffman Plastic Applied in Workers’ Compensation Cases 
Hoffman Plastic involved two competing federal laws, the NLRA and 
IRCA, each with a respective policy focus on labor and immigration; wherein 
the Supreme Court concluded that emphasizing the IRCA over the NLRA best 
resolves these national problems.195  Workers’ compensation cases, on the 
other hand, involve plaintiffs alleging under state law and workers’ 
compensation frameworks that they were employees injured on the job and, 
therefore, should be able to recover against their employer regardless of their 
undocumented status.196  The employers’ defenses to and litigation strategy 
regarding these workers’ compensation suits have commonly attempted to 
import Hoffman Plastic’s holding to prevent undocumented workers from 
recovering any remedies.197  This action by employers has now levied the 
IRCA federal law against state workers’ compensation laws, creating a 
firestorm of litigation that has led courts to weigh federal preemption against 
state police powers.198  The responses vary by state due to each one having a 
slightly varied definition of “employee” and differing policy positions on 
workers’ compensation; some courts have found (like the dissent in Hoffman 
Plastic) that there is no conflict199 while others have held the criminal acts of 
providing false documentation to preclude recovery.200 
B. Courts’ Responses to Application of Hoffman Plastic in Workers’ 
Compensation Cases 
The use of federal preemption as a bar to claims of undocumented workers 
in workers’ compensation cases via Hoffman Plastic is increasing and yet is 
being met with only limited success.201  Preemption is an operation of 
congressional intent.  “Congress may express its intent to preempt state law: 
‘(1) by expressly defining the extent of preemption; (2) by regulating an area 
 
 195. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 151–52 (2002). 
 196. Presmanes & Eisenberg, supra note 71, at 248–49. 
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so pervasively that an intent to preempt the entire field may be inferred; and 
(3) by enacting a law that directly conflicts with state law.’”202  There have 
been a variety of responses by courts across the country to cases involving 
workers’ compensation and Hoffman Plastic and two major trends have 
emerged: opinions employing and rejecting a preemption analysis203 and 
opinions employing a police power policy analysis.204  In both of these 
categories a majority of state courts have found that Hoffman Plastic is 
misplaced and not applicable to workers’ compensation cases. 
1. Category I: The IRCA & Hoffman Plastic Do Not Preempt States 
From Both Enacting Workers’ Compensation Systems that Include 
Undocumented Workers and Allow Recovery 
Many states have found that Congress intended neither express nor field 
preemption in the IRCA to disavow undocumented workers from being 
protected by workers’ compensation state statutes.205  These include Florida,206 
Georgia,207 Minnesota,208 and Pennsylvania.209 
Relying upon statutory construction and Minnesota workers’ compensation 
statutes against the purpose behind the IRCA, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
held, in Correa v. Waymouth Farms, Inc., that not only is there no preemption 
but there is truly no conflict.210  The court in Correa held that the Minnesota 
workers’ compensation statute defines employees as “any person who 
performs services for another for hire including . . . an alien,”211 thus making 
no distinction between documented/authorized and undocumented/ 
unauthorized workers.  The Minnesota Supreme Court held that “[t]he IRCA is 
not aimed at impairing existing state labor protections,” and thus, there was no 
federal preemption.212 
 
 202. Wet Walls, Inc. v. Ledezma, 598 S.E.2d 60, 63 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (quoting Ga. Pub. 
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 211. Id. (quoting MINN. STAT. § 176.011 subdiv. 9 (2002)). 
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Furthermore, the Minnesota legislature had impliedly addressed the issue 
by including aliens in their workers’ compensation statutes; thus, by the will of 
the people, recovery was not precluded by Hoffman Plastic.213  The Minnesota 
Supreme Court concluded that, due to Minnesota’s labor statutes and the lack 
of federal preemption in the IRCA, the employer’s reliance upon Hoffman 
Plastic was misplaced; until the legislature acted otherwise, undocumented 
workers were entitled to recover in Minnesota.214 
In Safeharbor Employer Services I, Inc. v. Cinto Velazquez, a case of first 
impression of applying Hoffman Plastic to workers’ compensation in Florida 
courts, the Florida appellate court affirmed the lower court’s ruling for the 
undocumented worker on a workers’ compensation claim.215  This court, 
relying on Correa and its own workers’ compensation statutes, found that the 
IRCA did not preempt state law.216  In finding no federal field preemption, the 
court relied upon the Supreme Court’s determination that workers’ 
compensation is an area of state police power and that Congress had not 
occupied the field,217 thus leaving Florida and its legislature free to enact 
workers’ compensation statutes that are inclusive to undocumented workers.218 
The Georgia Court of Appeals likewise found no federal preemption in 
Wet Walls v. Ledezma, which evaluated the workers’ compensation claim of a 
disabled and deported worker.219  The employer presented an affirmative 
defense, employing Hoffman Plastic as evidencing federal preemption 
doctrine, but the Georgia court found the argument unpersuasive; it held that 
there is no express or field preemption in the IRCA and no preclusion resulting 
from the Hoffman Plastic decision.220  Georgia’s Court of Appeals reaffirmed 
its position months later by issuing their decision in Continental Pet 
Technologies, Inc. v. Palacias, which allowed a worker to obtain benefits 
despite his status under the IRCA as undocumented.221  Thus, across the 
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country, state courts have concluded that the IRCA does not preempt recovery 
for undocumented employees under state workers’ compensation statutes. 
There are states that have swung the other way, as in Sanchez v. Eagle 
Alloy, Inc., in which a Michigan court reversed the lower courts holding that 
undocumented workers were allowed recovery.222  This Michigan court 
analogized to the Hoffman majority’s rationale that an undocumented worker 
providing false work authorization documents committed a crime and is barred 
from recovering under Michigan workers’ compensation statutes; thus, on state 
statutory application alone, the worker was precluded from protection.223  The 
court did hold, however, that while being undocumented precluded wage loss 
benefits, it did not preclude making the employer liable for plaintiff’s medical 
treatment expenses related to the work injury, for which the court held the 
employer responsible.224  Along with Sanchez, there have been courts in other 
states that have applied Hoffman Plastic’s rationale in workers’ compensation 
cases, finding that the criminal act of providing false documents does, in fact, 
remove the worker from statutory inclusion where illegal conduct bars 
recovery; however, none of these cases have pulled upon the language of 
Congressional preemption.225  While these courts are in the minority, it is 
illustrative that there remain trends across the country that leave a potential 
litigant—both employer and undocumented immigrant—unable to clearly 
predict results of a workers’ compensation claim. 
2. Category II: Hoffman Plastic Has no Application and No Policy Basis 
in Workers’ Compensation Cases 
While the aforementioned state courts have focused on the absence of 
preemption to allow undocumented workers to recover workers’ compensation, 
New York has not only found no preemption but consistently finds Hoffman 
Plastic toxically misplaced in workers’ compensation and tort claims.226  The 
New York cases tend to incorporate the Hoffman Plastic dissent in maintaining 
that there is no conflict between labor and immigration policies, and even if 
there were, properly effectuated labor laws are the solution to immigration 
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problems—not the inverted answer Rehnquist gave in Hoffman Plastic by 
allowing the IRCA to preempt NLRA penalties.227 
New York courts captured the dissent from Hoffman Plastic in the Cano v. 
Mallory Management decision, where the New York Supreme Court, in ruling 
that an undocumented worker was not precluded from recovering for tortious 
conduct of the employer, stated “[i]t is also interesting to note that every case 
citing Hoffman [Plastic] since it was rendered has either distinguished itself 
from it or has limited it greatly.”228  The Cano Court foreshadowed a line of 
New York workers’ compensation cases where courts would decline 
employers’ usage of Hoffman Plastic on grounds of strong public policy and 
state-based safety considerations.  Cano distinguished Hoffman Plastic’s facts 
from a negligence case about an undocumented employee sustaining severe 
injuries from electrocution while working.229  The court authoritatively found 
the workers’ status to be irrelevant to the tort claim and stated, “[i]t is contrary 
to the public policy of New York State that a person who claims to be injured 
as a result of tortious conduct may be barred from pursuing that claim in the 
courts of this State based upon the resident status of the claimant.”230  
Responding to the employers’ use of Hoffman Plastic to defend against the 
negligence suit, the court concluded: “Defendants can not [sic] negligently 
injure someone who is within this state legally or not, and then not be 
responsible to that injured person for the injuries sustained.”231  Already in 
2003, just one year after Hoffman Plastic, the New York courts made it clear 
that employers violating labor laws will not evade responsibility simply 
because the petitioner is undocumented.232  The workers’ compensation cases 
following Cano reaffirmed the New York court’s rationale. 
In Balbuena v. IDR Realty, the New York Court of Appeals concluded that 
the best way to serve the purpose of the IRCA and curb the employment of 
illegal labor would be to punish employers who hire illegal labor and create 
unsafe working environments for them.233  The court analyzed each 
preemption claim brought by the employer in turn.  In regards to express 
preemption, the court found the IRCA only preempted civil or criminal 
sanctions on undocumented workers, and since workers’ compensation is not a 
punishment but rather a compensation to the injured worker, Congress did not 
expressly preempt workers’ compensation claims.234  The preemption 
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argument likewise fell on deaf ears; the court felt that Congress evinced no 
intention to disrupt state regulation of occupational safety and health.235  The 
court finally found no conflict preemption, holding that while the federal 
government is in exclusive control of immigration law, the states historically 
have police power to ensure workplace safety; moreover, statutes to ensure 
workplace safety compliance for all state residents were not in conflict with 
the federal government’s attempts to curb illegal immigration.236  The court 
embraced the policy behind the Hoffman Plastic dissent, noting that limiting 
undocumented workers’ recovery gives employers incentive to not comply 
with labor laws which places both undocumented and lawful residents at risk, 
endangering the entire state.237  Far worse, the court continued, preemption 
would reward employers for not complying with the IRCA, since the worker 
whose claim would be denied had been employed without ever once being 
asked for proper IRCA-required documentation.238  The court stated that 
allowing Hoffman Plastic into workers’ compensation lends itself to a 
miscarriage of justice, since this usage of Hoffman Plastic defies the purpose 
of the IRCA by expressly encouraging illegal immigration and the hiring of 
undocumented workers.239  The court proposed a solution to the federal and 
state tensions by suggesting that plaintiff’s undocumented status could be one 
of many factors the jury considers in its deliberations, but the status cannot 
foreclose recovery nor should it be the sole factor to limit damages.240 
The Second Circuit, following the New York state court’s lead, held in 
Madeira v. Affordable Housing Foundation, Inc. that New York compensation 
laws were established to protect workers, they were not preempted, and that 
precluding recovery would encourage employers to create hazardous 
workplaces for all residents—legal and illegal.241  In this case, an 
undocumented worker was injured and brought a workers’ compensation suit 
against his employer in federal court for violating a New York scaffolding 
safety law.242  The district court found for the worker, and the Second Circuit 
affirmed, after analyzing federal and state law as well as public policy 
regarding why disallowing recovery would establish a dangerous incentive for 
further illegal immigration, workplace safety violations, and exploitation of 
undocumented workers.243 
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The court explained that while the worker entering the country 
undocumented concerns the federal government, there still exists a workplace 
safety duty between the worker and his employer according to New York 
law.244  Thus, like the dissent in Hoffman Plastic, the Second Circuit found the 
issues to be distinct and, here, found the labor safety laws of New York 
weighed in favor of a worker’s ability—regardless of residency status—to be 
able to effectuate safety statutes by bringing suit when injured.245  Borrowing 
reasoning from Balbuena, the Second Circuit found the nature of personal 
injury compensation to be unrelated to the IRCA’s sanctions, as the employer, 
not the employee, had violated the law.246  Nor had Congress evinced an intent 
to eradicate the traditional province of the states over employment 
compensation.247  Thus, field and express preemption were found to be 
inapplicable and could not stop recovery under New York law.248  Regarding 
conflict preemption, the Second Circuit stated that mere tension alone does not 
establish conflict preemption, especially when the area of law involves 
traditional police powers such as workers’ compensation.249  The Second 
Circuit, in finding no conflict, determined that it is possible to effectuate state 
workers’ compensation laws while still adhering to federal law.250 
The Second Circuit also explored the purpose behind both the IRCA and 
the New York workers’ compensation laws, finding the former unrelated to the 
claim and the latter essential to allow recovery.251  The New York workplace 
safety laws were created to provide “a swift and sure source of benefits to the 
injured employee,”252 and New York courts had found the status of a worker to 
be irrelevant to the ability to recover.253  This finding was particularly 
important since New York historically has been a beacon for immigrant 
employment and has a strong affinity for working immigrants.254  Thus, while 
the IRCA did criminalize some behaviors, the workplace safety and recovery 
for workers remained in force.255  In addition, New York law differed from 
other states’ in that New York imposes absolute liability on worksites where 
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general contractors fail to provide safe workplaces—even after Hoffman 
Plastic—and expressly extended such protections to undocumented workers.256  
The court did recognize that New York courts allow a jury to consider that lost 
earnings may be limited by deportation, as held in Balbuena, but reiterated that 
the employee’s undocumented status cannot alone bar suit.257 
Seemingly anticipating criticism from other courts, the Second Circuit 
directly addressed policy concerns of promoting proper incentives and curbing 
illegal immigration by exploring the purpose behind the IRCA.258  The Second 
Circuit argued that the focus of Congress was to punish employers who 
incentivized illegal immigration and not to punish the worker who was simply 
responding to employers’ pull.259  The court noted that the sanctions are 
harsher on employers who, in patterned conduct, prey on undocumented 
workers260 and, thereby, create an underpaid, overworked slave-class and 
dangerous work labor environments; whereas, the only penalties on workers 
apply to knowing violators who willfully provide false documents.261 
Finally, the court illustrated how Hoffman Plastic is both factually and 
legally distinguishable from a workers’ compensation case.262  In Hoffman 
Plastic, the employee deceived the employer into illegally employment, but 
here, the employer knowingly violated the IRCA by hiring an employee 
without any documentation.263  In terms of law, Hoffman Plastic involved two 
competing federal laws (NLRA, IRCA), and here, the employer was importing 
the IRCA into an otherwise simple state law claim involving workers’ 
compensation.264  The Second Circuit recognized the growing nationwide trend 
of employers citing Hoffman Plastic to avoid compensating injured employees 
strictly on the basis of their immigration status—despite many state courts 
refusing to allow windfalls for such employers.265  The court further stated that 
while the Supreme Court may have thought in Hoffman Plastic that allowing 
the IRCA to supersede the NLRA was the best policy, here in New York, the 
residents’ lives would be placed at risk by extending that holding to workers’ 
compensation cases.266  The Second Circuit, by limiting Hoffman Plastic to its 
own facts, supported the finding that workers’ compensation and illegal 
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immigration can be squared by hitting the strongest and most powerful 
economic target, the employers.267  To hold otherwise, the court hinted, would 
give credence to the ‘nod and wink’ undocumented labor empires of employers 
which encourage unsafe workplaces and worker abuse, and which fan the 
flames of illegal immigration—a grotesque outcome not desired by either New 
York or, arguably, by the federal government.268 
CONCLUSION 
Eight years have passed since Hoffman Plastic Compounds, and it remains 
a demon haunting the Supreme Court by showing up across the United States 
in federal and state courts, while illegal immigration races onward, undeterred 
by its holding.  While the Hoffman Plastic majority presumed that IRCA’s 
precluding NLRA back pay remedies would curb illegal immigration, instead a 
perverse usage has emerged.  Employers cite Hoffman Plastic preemption as 
an affirmative defense, which would allow them to hire undocumented 
workers, fire them when they organize for better working conditions, and then 
evade liability by denying remedy for someone who happened to be 
undocumented.  Hoffman Plastic, as critics contend, has in fact led to the 
erosion of labor statutes stretching back a century to protect both the resident 
and immigrant.  Resultantly, the undocumented laborer has few labor rights in 
a country built on immigration, equality, and opportunity. 
In a more disturbing twist, Hoffman Plastic has crept into workers’ 
compensation cases, where it threatens not merely back pay, but injured human 
beings suffering loss of limbs and excruciating pain sustained while working 
for the profit of an employer.  These employers attempt to use Hoffman Plastic 
to preclude recovery for such injuries—alleging federal preemption of state-
based workers’ compensation statutes.  The application of Hoffman Plastic in 
workers’ compensation would further dehumanize undocumented worker by 
not only taking their labor rights but also their human rights. 
So far, the response by courts across the country has been to limit Hoffman 
Plastic to its facts, with few cases allowing the extension of Hoffman Plastic to 
workers’ compensation.  The opinions, statutes, and outcomes vary because the 
incentives and issues behind illegal immigration, employee rights, and state 
police powers fluctuate per jurisdiction.  A growing trend evidenced in New 
York and the Second Circuit cases is that workplace safety and state police 
powers mandate recovery for workers regardless of their citizenship status.  
These courts do not support illegal immigration—in fact, quite to the 
contrary—they find the best way to curb it is what the Hoffman Plastic dissent 
realized: it is the one with the capital, the worksites, and the foremen hiring the 
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workers that must be disincentivized; anything else is a band-aid on the already 
gangrenous wound of economic exploitation. 
Illegal immigration is not a problem that can be deported.  Already, 
employers disregard the IRCA by actively hiring undocumented workers.  To 
preclude recovery for workers’ compensation is to encourage these employers 
by creating a license to exploit.  Furthermore, precluding the workers’ recovery 
inflicts collateral damage upon the U.S. economy and legitimately creates a 
twenty-first century class of disposable peasant workers.  This policy outcome 
defies our traditions, our Bill of Rights, and our intent to secure both the 
borders and the labor markets.  Congress must pass effective and economically 
thoughtful legislation to curb illegal immigration.  The IRCA is not enough.  
The Supreme Court and lower courts must protect the NLRA and workers’ 
compensation statutes from the perverse and dangerous usage made possible in 
Hoffman Plastic.  Then, and only then, will the “wink and nod” industries start 
to collapse and will Hoffman Plastic’s undocumented box be closed. 
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